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IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
by
William H. Gruber Donald G. Marquis
ABSTRACT
This concluding chapter in the proceedings of the MIT Conference
on the Human Factor in the Transfer of Technology summarizes and integrates
the findings of the papers presented at the conference. The disparity
between the current state of knowledge about the human factor in
technology transfer and a preferred state is specified in a series
of questions that were raised at the conference. The research frontier
is described; definitions of terms are suggested for further research
efforts, and models that specify the critical problems for further
investigation are presented.
The summary of the current state of knowledge indicates that
better understanding of the technology transfer process has the
potential for a significant increase in the economic value of technical
knowledge, due to the observed phenomenon that technical advance is
based largely on readily available technical knowledge. The process
of fusion of "demand recognition" (defined as a perceived disparity
between an actual and a preferred technological capability) and
"technical feasibility recognition" (defined as the perception that
technical progress can be achieved) is described, and the role of
this fusion (defined as "design concept") in the process of technical
advance is analyzed.
* Assistant Professor of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
// Professor of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
2The human factor determinants of the ability /willingness to have the
recognition necessary for the achievement of design concept are summarized
under the following categories of effect: (1) training and experience,
(2) individual personality characteristics, (3) communication patterns,
(4) organizational effects, (5) mission orientation, (6) motivation.
The findings that have been presented are then used to study the science-
technology relationship.
INTRODUCTION*
Technology may be defined as the means or capacity to perform
a particular activity. The transfer of technology must then mean the
utilization of an existing technique in an instance where it has not
previously been used, This transfer may be merely the acceptance by
a user of a practice common elsewhere, or it may be a different application
of a given technique designed originally for another use.
The acceptance by a user of a common practice is called "adoption,"
and the spread of such adoptions the "diffusion of technology."
The application of technology in a new way is properly labeled an
"innovation."** A transfer of technology occurs in both adoption and
innovation in the sense that a decision is made to use a form of technology
where it has not previously been utilized.
* This chapter summarizing and integrating the findings presented in
papers given at the MIT Conference on the Human Factor in the Transfer
of Technology will refer to the papers given at the conference by
reference to the author of the paper, Citation to findings in the
published literature will be given in the reference section at the end
of this paper.
** Some studies ( e,
g
,
Myers, 1967) have called an "innovation" any new
utilization of a technique in a firm whether or not the technology was
commonly used in the industry in which the firm was located. As far as
the situation internal to the firm is concerned, this does represent
an "innovation " A process study of the transfer of technology can be
conducted more efficiently if the distinction between innovation and
diffusion of technology is made explicit, as suggested in this paper.
Note that a form of use occurs in both cases- If technical
elements are brought together in a new way and a new technology results,
this would be called an "invention" until it is used to satisfy a demand,
at which point an "innovation" occurs. Research on the transfer of
technology thus focuses on "innovation" and "diffusion" because the word
"technology" connotes a method of achieving a practical purpose or "use."
"Use" requires at least one user in the broad economic meaning of
the word. A product must be sold, a piece of equipment must be used,
or a unit of military weaponry must be put into production in order
to qualify as examples of transferred technology. The economic meaning
of "use", therefore, connotes utilization to satisfy a demand or need
for a product or service,
THE PROCESS OF TECHNICAL ADVANCE
Morton (1967, p, 153) has described the millimeter wave transmission
project in Bell Telephone Laboratories as a "serious failure" because
the economic need had not yet appeared despite the technical progress
made in the project's life span of 30 years. It is possible to have
"technical advance" without economic use as illustrated in Figure 1,
a four-stage diagram of technical advance.
Figure 1 demonstrates that at a given point in time (t=0) there
exists a state-of-the-art situation or inventory of technical knowledge.
This technical knowledge is embodied in various economic uses, and these
uses may be tabulated at a given point in time (stage I, t=0).
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Stage II indicates activity to advance the level of technical
knowledge by means of invention and scientific discovery. There may be
an increase in technical knowledge in stage II that will never reach
utilization. This technical advance would, therefore, not enter into
the magnitude of economic value calculated for the use of technical
knowledge, There may be transfer of technology from stage I to stage II
but this transfer will not have an economic value until there is a use
resulting from it.
If the technical advance achieved in stage II reaches at least one
economic use, then innovation takes place, and the process moves into
stage III, a first use of a technical advance. The transfer of technology
used in the inventive stage new achieves an economic value. Until stage III
is reached, there can be no economic value to a transfer of technology.
It is now possible to trace a transfer of technology from stage I through
the invention activity in stage II and then into stage III where the
technology transfer attained an economic value as an innovation, After
stage III has been successfully reached, the economic value of the
technology transfer will be increased as multiple uses (diffusion) of the
innovation take place.*
The macro-economic value of the technology transferred is determined
by the activity in stage IV, Each adoption in stage IV represents
a technical advance for the economy as a demand is satisfied by a good or
service embodying the use of the technical advance.
* Toulmin described the process of technical advance with an analogy from
zoology: mutation, selection, diffusion, and dominance. The measurement
of value in economic terms permits the same cycle suggested by Toulmin.
Economic motivation leads to attempts at achieving dominance through efforts
at the earlier stages of technical advance diagrammed in Figure 1.
The introduction of diesel locomotives provides a good example
of the process of technical advance (cf. Hogan, 1958). A switching
diesel with inadequate power was developed by a combination of Ingersoll-Rand,
American Locomotive, and General Electric. Ten railroads tried it before
the first sale was made to a railroad in 1925. The Electro-Motive Division
of General Motors began work on diesel locomotives for line use (distance
hauling ii contrast to yard switching) when most of the needed technology
was in stage I. The General Motors effort was initiated at the request
of Ralph Budd, a railroad executive who was concerned about the loss of
passenger business, The initial innovation, the use of the first line
diesel by the railroad managed by Ralph Budd, occurred in 1934. Relative
to the ease of this innovation, the process of diffusion was difficult
because of the resistance of railroad management.
General Motors used a number of techniques to achieve diffusion,
Guarantees of improved performance, the loan of diesels when a sale
could not be made, agreement to give maintenance at a rate half the cost
of maintaining a steam locomotive, and long-term credit terms helped to
facilitate diffusion.
It is important to differentiate the innovator (stage III) from the
adopter (stage IV), It takes more courage, foresight, imagination, and
willingness to take risks at stage III than at stage IV, The experience
of the innovator is available to the adopter.
An increase in technical knowledge is expected to result from
activity in stage II. It is probable that many innovations that represent
technology transfer from inventory (stage I) to first new utilization
(stage III) will also stimulate an increase in the inventory of technical
knowledge as a result of the experience gained in working with a new use
of a given kind of technology,
Three time periods are identified in Figure 1. Technical advance
and the processes of technology transfer and utilization are, of course,
continuous in nature. The three time periods are defined for purposes
of analysis. It is possible to examine the inventory of technical knowledge
and the economic value of the utilization of technical knowledge at
a point in time (t=0) , and advances above this base period can be studied
(stages II, III, and IV), For any given event, the timing of the stages
is a useful form of presentation. For total activity during the period
lasting from t=0 to t=l all three stages of activity occur simultaneously.*
INVENTORY OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION**
The value of the available technology for both invention and innovation
is clearly demonstrated in many studies. From Table 11 of Allen's paper,
it is possible to calculate that only 73 of 2 76 messages accepted (technical
information used) were products of analysis and experimentation. All other
accepted messages were examples of the utilization of available technical
* In fact, the inventory level stage I can be conceived as moving across
the period in real time terms. The first difference presentation of the
process can be converted into a continuous function once the process is
understood.
** This phrase is used rather than the common use of the words "transfer
of technology" to describe the phenomena under investigation. "Technical
information" (whether embodied in words, ideas, or physical objects) appears
to be a better description of what is transferred. The more general concept
will be used frequently because of the fact that it is difficult to separate
applied science from technology. "Technical information" and "technology"
will be used interchangeably in this chapter because of the acceptance of
the word "technology,"
information.* Tanenbaum (1967, p. 152) reports that "available knowledge"
was of critical importance in the majority of the samples of innovations
studied by the Materials Advisory Board of the National Academy of Sciences,
yers (1967, p, 140) reports that two-thirds** of the technical information
eeded was readily available to the innovators in the sample of 567
commercially successful innovations identified in his study of 121 firms
in three industries.
One might expect that if a given unit of technology were available,
people with problems to solve would seek it out, and the question of the
transfer of technology would be one of somehow indexing available technology
to provide easier access. The MIT Conference was initiated on the assumption
that the limitations of transfer were not due to the failure in some
mechanical screening process. Instead, the problems of technology transfer
were conceived as resulting from the relationship of people to the technology
utilization process.
* It is not possible from Allen's research to determine the proportion
of the accepted messages that resulted from analysis and experimentation
that might have been discovered through the other sources of information
in his analysis rather than through actual research efforts. That is to say,
it is probable that not all of the 73 accepted technical messages from
analysis and experimentation had to come from that source, had better
utilization been made of existing technology.
** About half of the innovations were based on information available
within the innovating company; half used information sources external
to the company.
The inventory of available technology increases as a function of time
and of the number of people involved with inventive effort, A small increase
in the rate of technology transfer ( i.e . , an increase in the speed and
amount of utilization of available technology) would clearly be of enormous
consequence. Despite the benefits that might be expected from an increase
in the use of available technology, research on the development and utilization
of technology is of recent origin,
UTILIZATION OF EXISTING TECHNICAL INFORMATION
The ability and the willingness to discover and use available
technical information varies among countries, among industries and regions
within a country, among firms within an industry, and among technical
personnel within a firm or geographic region. Performance has been found
to vary over time even within the same industry in the same country (e.g .
,
Gruber's report on the rise and fall of the steel industry in the United
States) , It is now important to seek the determinants for the variance
in the utilization of available technology.
A review of the papers in this volume provides examples and sources
of explanation for some categories of this variance. McClelland noted
that scientists are educated in such a way as not to seek practical use
from their discoveries. Empirical support is furnished by the finding
reported by Roberts that scientists (those educated with a Ph.D.) tend not
to be as successful in founding businesses as are technical personnel
with lower levels of educational attainment.
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The variance among firms in the use of technology was noted by
Burns and Stalker (1961) and Carter and Williams (1957), Gellman (1967)
posits that innovative firms and industries tend to deal with similar firms
and industries because of the difficulty in selling new technical ideas to
firms with low ability or willingness to innovate and accept new technology.
This may contribute to an explanation of why whole industries (such as
the steel industry in the United States) in a relatively innovative country
may fail to respond to new technology . An industry may get the quality
of suppliers or supporting industry that it deserves. This phenomenon
may also explain differences in country-wide performance such as have been
evident in the failure of France relative to Germany to achieve exports of
technologically intensive products (Gruber, Mehta and Vernon, 1967),
is apparent that the ability /willingness* to achieve technology
:ransfer can determine the relative success of industries or countries.
When the focus of attention shifts from the ability to develop new science
or technology to the question of the ability /willingness to utilize new
technology, then a different way of keeping score becomes necessary.
As Toulmin noted in his paper, the fact that an invention developed in
Britain (the Hovercraft) was put into first commercial utilization by
a Swedith firm may be an indication of a weakness in the orientation of
British industrialists which may offset the strength of inventive
capabilities manifest in the technical development of the Hovercraft.
* The concept of ability /willingness to innovate has often been expressed
in the literature as "resistance to innovation," Due to the fact that there
are positive as well as negative values in the ability /willingness to
innovate, the use of "resistance" gives an unbalanced impression of the
phenomenon.
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The value to be derived from an increase in the efficiency of technology
transfer leads to an interest in the determinants of variance in transfer
capability. The MIT Conference focus was on the human factor, and it is
obvious that no technology transfer occurs without human activity.
A total set of determinants of the ability /willingness of humans to transfer
technology must include economic variables, such as competitive pressure,
capital resources, market potential, etc, that were analyzed in Gruber's
paper. The focus on the human factor provides a study at a lower level
than that of a total systems analysis. Progress at this level is, however,
necessary to provide the values for a more complex, higher-order analysis,
given the short history of research on this problem and the paucity of
verified findings
.
RECOGNITION OF DEMAND AND TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
The first step in the process of utilization of technology is demand
recognition, This is in harmony with the idea expressed by Pounds (1965)
that the solution to a problem is conditional on problem identification.
Some precise definitional considerations are necessary before this basic
concept of demand recognition can be used,
A more common expression is need recognition. Needs are infinite.
There must be a willingness to act , to allocate resources to meet a given
need, before need is translated into demand. For example, Galbraith (1958)
in The Affluent Society , expressed the opinion that there was a need
for public sector services that was not being met because of the values
of those who influence resource allocations between public and private
sectors. At the time of Galbraith's book, these needs were not expressed
as demands and funds were not supplied for such activities as air pollution
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control, education of the poor, and health services for the aged. Everyone
has a need for something more than they have; demand represents the choices
that are made giving a funding constraint.
A critical factor in technology transfer is, therefore, the recognition
of demands that are not being satisfied by the technology currently in use.
A second factor is the recognition of technical feasibility.
Technical feasibility recognition is defined as the discovery that
available technical information (with perceived modifications) would provide
a new technical capability. This does not indicate that a potential use
( j e . , demand recognition) has been identified „ Large expenditures are
made in fields such as heavy particle physics and lasers because of
technical feasibility recognition despite the failure to link the expected
advances in technical capabilities with specified uses that are based
upon demand recognition.
Innovation is most likely to be initiated when recognition of a demand
and a feasible technical solution for the specified demand are fused and
a satisfactory technical response to a user requirement becomes available.
Figure 2 diagrams this process of fusion, occurring before search and
inventive activity has been undertaken. Other diagrams would be necessary
to illustrate situations where demand and technical feasibility recognition
were not simultaneous as indicated in Figure 2. Demand recognition may
result in the initiation of inventive behavior without technical feasibility
recognition (e.g ., the national cancer research effort). And, as indicated
in the example of the heavy particle research program, technical feasibility
recognition may result in the funding of inventive effort without a perceived
economic demand for the results of the expected technical progress.
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The demand-technical feasibility fusion phenomenon as illustrated
in the micromodel of technical advance presented in Figure 2 may result
in two further stages of action. Further search, adaptation and inventive
activity (noted as I) may be necessary, or a solution may be conceived
without a significant input into further search and inventive effort
(diagramed in flow II of Figure 2)
.
If demand-technical feasibility fusion occurs successfully ( i e . , the
perceptions of demand and technical feasibility are accurate) , then
innovation and diffusion of innovation will occur.*
Demand recognition results from an awareness of a desired state
that is superior to the actual state fcr the satisfaction of a specified
demand. In order to make the concept of demand recognition or the concept
of fusion into design concept operational, it is necessary to specify how
such actions occur.
Take, for example, Goldmark's invention of the long-play microgroove
record. It has been reported that Goldmark experienced demand recognition
when he was listening to Horowitz playing Brahms and was annoyed when his
pleasure ended with a click of the 78 r.p.m. record at an inopportune time.
Goldmark then invented the 33 r.pm record (Edson, 1967, p. 82). It is
* A more complex model should take into account economic factors such as
the resources of the organization in which the demand-technical feasibility
fusion occurred. The ability /willingness to achieve the diffusion of a
successful demand-technical feasibility fusion may require resources that
are not available to the innovator. Demand may be latent, and have to be
created in order to achieve the full economic potential of the innovation.
The micro model in Figure 2 concentrates on the first three stages of Figure 1
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probable that there were many music lovers before Goldmark who were enraged
by the limitations of the 78 r.p.m. record system. But Goldmark did something
about the problem, and he is credited with demand-technical feasibility
recognition,
A perception rated as demand recognition clearly requires some effort "
or response to the perceived demand. The person credited with demand
recognition must initiate action to move toward a perceived preferred state.
Design concept also requires action in order to bring an improvement based
upon demand and technical feasibility to some observable level of technical
realization closer to an innovation than existed previously.** Ability/
willingness to take action, as defined at the MIT conference, is thus an
indispensable factor in the process of technology transfer into utilization
(stages III and IV of Figure 1)
.
The combination of design concept and ability/willingness to take
action is described by Morison (1966, Chapter 2) in his "Gunfire at Sea"
example. It is probable that the inaccuracy of naval gunfire had been
recognized previously.*** But it was Sir Percy Scott who invented
continuous-aim firing. The example illustrates two ideas. First, all
of the technology needed for continuous-aim firing (telescope, elevating gear,
* An important area for further research would be on the identification
of situations where some form of demand identification is expressed and
no action is taken,
** It is insufficient to work toward an invention without a specified demand
in mind. It is for this reason that the requirement of moving closer to
an innovation (a use) than to an invention (a technical advance) is specified
as necessary for design concept recognition.
*** Morison (1966, p. 22) reports that, "In 1899 five ships of the North
Atlantic Squadron fired five minutes each at a lightship hulk. .. .After
twenty-five minutes of banging away, two hits had been made on the sails
of the elderly vessel."
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the gun) was readily available. Second, the combination of fusion into
design concept and ability /willingness to respond had to exist. Examples
cited earlier show that there can be design concept fusion resulting in
invention without the ability /willingness to respond to demand by achieving
innovation and its diffusion.
The micro process in Figure 2 may be related to the structure of the
process of technical advance presented in Figure 1. The current state
of technical knowledge and its use is the same concept in both cases.
Naturally, interest at the micro level in Figure 2 is with a specific subset
of the total as presented in Figure 1. A movement from stage I to stage III
as diagrammed in Figure 1 is similar to the case II situation in Figure 2,
because in both instances the needed technical knowledge is available
The relationship between Figures 1 and 2 permits the integration
of most of the available research on the process of technical advance and
technology transfer,
The process of technical advance vis-a-vis the utilization of the
inventory of available technical knowledge is a function of: (1) demand
recognition; (2) technical feasibility recognition, and (3) the ability/
willingness to achieve utilization provided by recognition and subsequent
development of a solution. What are the determinants of these three factors
in the transfer of technology into new uses? How do the determinants vary
by level of organization? These two questions are presented in Figure 3
where the determinants of recognition and ability/willingness are related
to the level of organization under investigation.
The specified cells in Figure 3 have been left empty because of the
paucity of information currently available on the problem.
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The work of future research on these questions may well be conceived
in terms of completing the gaps that are structured by Figure 3. The
present low level of understanding of the process leading to the utilization
of new technology has serious consequences. It is possible to cite
innumerable examples of failures or lost opportunities that have resulted
from the fact that these most basic elements in the transfer of technology
are, in practice, almost a random process.*
HUMAN FACTORS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The process of technology transfer from inventory to utilization
(from stage I to stages III and IV in Figure 1) is a sequence that often
passes through inventive activity (stage II in Figure 1) . Figure 2 presented
a micro model in which demand and technical feasibility recognition fuse in
design conceptualization „ Figure 3 shows that research on the problem
should include different levels at which the factors of demand-technical
feasibility recognition and ability /willingness combine to achieve
utilization. Given the cells created by Figure 3, the available evidence
will be presented for the following determinants of technology transfer:
(1) Training and experience
(2) Individual personality characteristics
(3) Communication patterns
(4) Organizational effects
(5) Mission orientation
(6) Motivation
* An enumeration of examples would include the following kind of experience,
The possible use of estrogens (part of the steroid class of drugs) for birth
control was not recognized until recently. Early in the 1950 's women were
warned not to take certain drugs because of the antifertility effect. That
this side effect was considered a deterrent to the sale of this class of
drugs rather than a potential finding for a major market need is an example
of both the nature and the importance of the demand recognition phenomenon.
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Figure 3 ; Determinants of demand and technical feasibility
recognition and ability /willingness to achieve
utilization given a solution by level of organization
Level of
Organization
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Although these factors will be presented separately, they are
interrelated, and it is not possible at the present level of understanding
to clearly separate the effects where causation appears to result from
several factors. Available research is not adequate to complete the cells
created by Figure 3. It is, therefore, not possible to divide the findings
by the level dimension.
A far more complex structure could have been presented. Ability
to respond is clearly a different concept from the willingness to respond.
Recognition of demand and recognition of technical feasibility are
associated with different human factor considerations than the process of
fusion in the design concept. The available findings tend to be partial
in nature and do not complete any dimension of this structure. A major
contribution of the following review of findings is that it serves to
illustrate the quality of information that is needed for a more complete
understanding of the determinants of the recognition and the ability/
willingness aspects of the human factor in the transfer of technology.
1. Training and experience : Since many innovations are achieved
on the basis of readily available knowledge, it follows that
the training and experience of the persons involved would be
a critical factor. When search is required for invention,
the same qualifications would be essential. One of the most
generally accepted propositions put forward at the conference
was aptly summarized by Burns: "The mechanism of technological
transfer is one of agents, not agencies; of the movement of people
* Note that these determinants are limited to the human factor facet
of the question. Economic factors are discussed in Gruber's paper.
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between establishments, rather than the routing of information
through [formal] communications systems." Derek Price noted
in his paper that engineers tend not to write, and thus applied
technology of recent vintage is not in the literature. Engineers,
according to Allen, also tend not to read. The trend toward
greater specialization of technical effort, the increase in the
volume of technical information, and the speed of technological
advance are all factors leading to the idea that it is more
efficient to bring into an organization someone experienced in
a given technology than to try to develop expert personnel in
an organization. Research results on this practice were not
reported at the conference, and the evidence that was given
tended to be case experiences
.
Research on this phenomenon would also be of value at the
international level. It is alleged that mobility of personnel
(movement from one organization to another or movement within
an organization) is of value in itself, Europeans have begun
to think of employment stability (firm loyalty) as a possible
factor in the technology gap. There is enough contrary evidence*
(such as the stability of employment in Japan, a country noted
for the speed with which technology is transferred from foreign
* The personnel identified as sources of events in the Project
Hindsight study moved less frequently (only 45 percent reported
more than two employers) than the average of technical personnel
in industrial research laboratories (75 percent) . (Personal
communication from Raymond Isenson after the conference.)
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sources to domestic utilization) to indicate that further
research on this facet of the usefulness of personnel transfer
is warranted.
Allen's paper presented evidence that internal sources were
more effective in generating useful technical information than
sources external to the firm. He explains this finding in
terms of the development within a firm of a communications coding
system that facilitates the transfer of technical information.
Both the training and experience of technical personnel are involved
in this finding. A consequent personnel strategy would be to have
staff in a firm that was equal in breadth to the technical needs
of the research to be undertaken — in contrast to reliance upon
outside consultants or contractors for areas of technical weakness.
The usefulness of scientists working on applied projects in
industry is evidence of the training-experience effect, Scientists
have had different training from that of engineers. Reiss pointed
out that scientists working in a firm are able to become aware
of the problems or needs toward which they can apply their specialized
training. Allen's findings on the importance of a common code
for discussion and Reiss' report on the process by which scientists
and engineers communicate within a firm should be viewed as two
facets of the same phenomenon.
Studies of the experience effect indicate that age (years of
experience) is of critical importance. Apparently a number of years
is required before a technically trained person is likely to contribute
to significant technical events, The average age of Hindsight
personnel identified with critical advances in technology was
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34 years,* Roberts reported the average age of entrepreneurs
as 32, and Pelz and Andrews (1967) found that the productivity
of scientists and engineers did not reach a maximum before age
35 to 40.
The role of training is demonstrated in the findings reported
by Isenson* and Tanenbaum (196 7) that critical inventions were
contributed in much greater frequency by personnel with higher
levels of education (above a bachelor's level) than would be
expected by the proportion of advanced degree personnel working
on technical projects.
Shapero was able to relate the level of educational attainment
and the average age of scientists and engineers to the nature of
the technology in his study of differences in regional resources
of technical manpower He found that regions where the newer,
more advanced technology was concentrated had technical personnel
with a higher average level of education than that of personnel
in regions with older, less dynamic technology. The personnel
in the regions with the new technology tended to be younger than
the personnel in regions with less advanced technology. This
indicates that the flow of personnel with advanced training
from schools is directed toward regions requiring younger personnel
trained at the frontier of new science and technology. Shapero 's
findings provide insight into the importance of the educational
process in responding to the needs of advanced technological activity
* Personal communication from Raymond Isenson subsequent to
the MIT conference.
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Price, et. aL reported on the efforts of the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) to assist in the process
through which work at the technological frontier is performed
by personnel educated in the required new science and engineering.
The AFOSR identifies new areas of science and engineering for
which personnel will be required for the success of Air Force
R&D projects. Then AFOSR funds research in the universities
that helps to develop the personnel with the expected new
educational experience and training.
2. Individual Personality Characteristics : Frustration tolerance,
need for achievement, and other such personality traits clearly
vary between individuals, and classes of individuals (explained
by family background and other such conditioning socio-economic
variables). Roberts' findings of the age, need for achievement,
and religious background variables associated with the successful
formation of new technical enterprises by entrepreneurs would be
examples of this determinant of recognition-abilitv/willingness
to respond.
The ability to formulate a design concept, the fusion of
demand and technical feasibility recognition, is one of the rare
gifts about which little is known at the individual personality
level. The question of individual personality characteristics
is related to other determinants such as organizational environment,
as Pelz and Andrews (1967) have indicated.
Morison (1966, pp. 24 and 27) describes the innovators of
continuous firing at sea in Britain and the United States, Scott
and Sims, to be men who were intolerant of bureaucratic inertia.
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Schon noted that the transfer of technology was an activity
that required a high level of motivation due to the difficulties
inherent in the process. Efforts have been made in a number of
firms to reduce the barriers to innovation. Further researcli
on the personality characteristics of individuals with a high
propensity for demand-technical feasibility fusion and the
ability/willingness to respond would assist such efforts at
organizational improvement,,
Communication Patterns : Allen reports on the effect of a common
coding system within a firm in providing useful technical
information, Myers (1967) reported the importance of the transfer
of technical information external to the firm as a critical source
of innovation. Meadows and Marquis (1967, p„ 16) reported that
the commercial value of R&D projects initiated by marketing and
customers was far greater than that of projects initiated within R&D,
Cochrane (196 7) reported that firms where non-R&D managers were
more involved with the control of R&D were rated as having more
effective R&D efforts (and, therefore, more transfer of technology
into utilization) than firms where more of the control of R&D was
maintained by R&D personnel.
These findings relate to the required fusion of demand and
technical feasibility recognition. Communication within a firm
and to the external environment are found to have explanatory
power when differences in performance have been identified.
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In a recent survey of the relationship between R&D and other
corporate functions,* it was discovered that only 9 of 25 firms
had recognized the importance of this communications factor by
setting up a permanent group to coordinate R&D with other
corporate functions,
An unusual illustration of the process of communication
patterns in the introduction of new technology was reported
by Black in his study of the effect of Government funded R&D on
the management of commercial R&D, Black noted that the experience
of doing Government funded R&D in the same laboratory with commercial
R&D led to a spillover of Government—required managerial technology
into the commercial R&D activity. This finding is in harmonv with
Allen's work on the development within a firm of a common coding
system for communication. Once a new practice has been brought into
a firm, such as managerial technology required as part of Government-
funded R&D, then diffusion is much easier than in situations where
new technology must be brought in from outside the firm.
4. Organizational Effects : Research by Jewkes , et. al . (1959) and
Hamberg (1963) indicates that major inventions rarely occur in
the large firms that service an industry and that, in fact, major
inventions most frequently are a result of activity from sources
* Part of a study of relationships between R&D and other corporate
functions conducted by one of the authors.
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other than the industry most involved with the application
of the invention."
How can this source of major innovations outside of an
industry be explained?** Three hypotheses have enough merit
to warrant further research on this question. The first is the
resistance to change within an organization. That is, once an
activity has become established with a given pattern, the response
of the power structure in an organization is to reject innovations
that would alter the existing activities. Roberts in his paper
reported of attempts within large corporations to encourage
entrepreneurship in order to remedy this resistance to change.
A second hypothesis is that people trained to do a job one way
will not experience novel demand-feasibility recognition.
A third hypothesis is that organizations acting in a given way
have a vested interest (because of capital investment and other
considerations) in maintaining the status quo.. For example,
if an innovation will make obsolete what an organization is doing,
* The finding on the source of invention or innovation should be
considered together with the ability to achieve utilization factors.
There may be diseconomies to scale in invention and economies to
scale in marketing. If size has a positive effect for one kind
of activities and a negative effect in another class of activities,
then the net effect should be considered when judging the question
of economies of scale. If the net effect is to form larger firms,
then correction of the diseconomies to scale problem of a functional
activity (such as invention or innovation) is necessary because
the trend will be toward organization of larger size.
'v * See the Department of Commerce Studies (1963 and 1967) for an
extended analysis of this phenomenon. Note that there is a
difference between demand recognition or technical feasibility
recognition and the ability /willingness to achieve the diffusion
of an innovation See Gruber's paper for the economic advantages
that are related to size of firm or the ability to achieve utilizatio
question.
27
it may pay in the short run to continue that activity rather
than to accept the innovation. This opens the field to innovators
outside the organization or industry.
The involvement of non-R&D personnel in the management of R&D
need not reduce flexibility in the management of R&D. Improved
understanding of the requirements of R&D function is often
associated with involvement of non-R&D managers. The Hindsight
work reported by Isenson and the Materials Advisory Hoard study
reported by Tanenbaum (1967) illustrates the importance of
communication which provides for flexibility of funding and objectives.
These reports found that flexibility of funding and objectives was
associated with the utilization of new technology (in 7fS and 80 percent
of the reported cases, respectively).
Mission Orientation : Organizational effort allocated specifically
for the purpose of discovering demand situations to which the
organization is best able to respond, and the development within
an organization of a commitment for the translation of demand
recognition into organizational action, is perhaps the most
efficient way to achieve a technological response to a given demand.
The allocation of resources to this process appears to be a useful
form of investment. The sources of important technical contributions
to a system given in Isenson's paper indicate the value of system
definition in the utilization of new technology. Isenson reported
that 64 percent of all the critical technical events in his study
resulted from the specification of a DoD systems analysis.
A further finding was that 37 percent of all events occurred
in a late stage (engineering development) of the effort when
demand was easiest to recognize.
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If a firm can respond to a commercial market, then demand
recognition can be fostered through market research that should
attempt to link the technical, marketing, and other firm resources
with the demand from customers for products or services that are
presently unavailable A major problem has been the inadequate
attention given to the required communication between marketing
and technical personnel in order to create an internal structure
favorable to demand-technical feasibility fusion.
The difference between progress in science and progress in
technology can be better understood through analysis of a concept
of Derek Price. Price developed the idea that technological advance
flows from technological activity in a manner similar to that in
which new science flows from old science. He was not able to
document the technological advance hypothesis with the literature
count technique that he used in his studies of scientific effort
(c.f. Price, 1963).
The science frontier tends to shift as new paradigms are
discovered for the solution of problems. Technology is directed
more by economic value, and it would be expected that technological
progress could be predicted better by the shifts in the demand for
different kinds of technological requirements.
When demand creates the awareness of a need for new technology,
that appears to be a major factor in the discovery and utilization
of new technology. Myers* found in his study of 56 7 industrial
innovations that the personnel in the firms were working "actively"
Personal communication subsequent to the MIT conference.
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with "high priority" in 38 percent of the situations, and "active
work" with "low priority" was present in an additional 35 percent
of the cases. Thus, recognized need that leads to active search
or inventive activity appears to be a critical determinant of
technological advance.
The Department of Defense does not have a commercial market
to which it can respond. As a consequence, DoD has devoted far
greater attention than private industry to systems analysis for
the specification of future weapons. The internal structures
within DoD that provide systems development services have attempted
to link technical resources, financial consideration, and perceived
capabilities to meet perceived military needs (a proxy for the
market demand of private industry). This mission-oriented systems
development program increased the probability of design conceptual-
ization because demand and technical factors are considered
simultaneously Available technology reduces the estimated cost
of a new system and, therefore, the probability of technology
transfer is increased because of comparisons between costs and
benefits from various alternative funding decisions for new weapons
development.
Technology transfer that results in economic utilization
(stages III and IV of Figure 1) was the primary focus of the
conference. It is relevant, therefore, to note that demand
(the decision to utilize) is a function of technical and cost
factors. Mission orientation that specifies the value system
of the user stimulated the establishment of technical and cost
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requirements to achieve utilization. The education of engineers
tends to emphasize the technical facet of the mission, and it is
useful to define mission orientation in terms of sales dollars of
utilization rather than the solution to a technical problem.
Recognition of organizational objectives, in contrast to functional
objectives, through mission orientation should increase the
motivation to work toward the fulfillment of the appropriate objective
Motivation : This determinant of recognition and ability /willingness
to respond permits a systems analysis of individual and organizational
behavior. Motivation as a force may be divided into four facets
for consideration: (a) competition; (b) the reward structure,
(c) visibility of results; and (d) government regulation.
The expectation that competition will innovate first and gain
an advantage provides a mental set that increases the awareness
of customer requirements that leads in turn to demand recognition
and the ability /willingness to achieve the utilization of new
technology. Reward structure becomes a motivational factor when
it is observed that organizations or individuals will generally
do chat for which they are rewarded, The structure of rewards
may not be designed to encourage demand recognition or the willingness
to take the risks often necessary in order to achieve utilization
Visibility of results affects motivation, because low visibility
tends to reduce the level of motivation. Low visibility often
affects the reward structure, because it is difficult to reward
or punish behavior that is not visible (difficult to measure).
* Too much competition may lower profits and the resources involvec
in the ability factor as indicated in Gruber's paper.
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Government regulation often motivates (in some cases, even forces)
organizations to respond in a given way, and this has an effect
on whether there will be demand recognition and the ab ility/vil I Lngness
to achieve the utilization of technology,
All of these facets of the motivation determinant have positive
and negative values. There are interrelationships between the
factors in many situations, Some examples now follow to illustrate
the relationship between these four factors that affect motivation
as a determinant in demand recognition and the ability/willingness
to achieve technology utilization,
Wright's study of NASA's efforts to achieve commercial
utilization of its advanced technology noted that efforts to achieve
transfer ended in failure except in cases where top management
was aware of the potential contribution from the introduction of
technology developed by NASA, Wright's report of this critical
determinant of technical transfer is in harmony with the hypothesis
of the importance of motivation in the introduction or adoption
of new technology
The speed of introduction of new generations of computer
equipment has been largely a function of competitive pressure,
An announcement by one manufacturer of a new capability has been
followed very rapidly by the introduction of computers with an
advanced technological capability by the other computer manufacturers.
If IBM, the largest computer manufacturer, had technology
that was far superior to its competition, it is probable that
there would be reluctance to push the utilization of this technology
to the point where competition was forced out of business
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such as che uncontrollable force of competition (or its absence)
are perhaps one of the most important determinants of the
recognition and the ability/willingness essential to achieve
technology utilization.,
Schon observed at the MIT conference that "the mere existence
of a lot of technical information, data, or technology is no reason
per se for spending money to get it used." He asked, "Do you
concentrate on transferring technology that already exists, or do
you concentrate on working with problems that seem to require
technological innovation?" The answers to Schon's questions can
be found in the human factors in the transfer process. Mission
orientation and the motivation to innovate appear to be the key
determinants of transfer, not the availability or an inventory
of technical informations
A similar reaction to the MIT conference papers was given by
Menzel who observed, "Perhaps the more crucial question is not so
much, 'Is there some existing information that could help me to
perform my tasks?' as it is, 'Should I perhaps take on new tasks
in view of information that exists somewhere? 1 "
THE SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY RELATIONSHIP
There has been discussion and debate about how science becomes embodied
in advanced technology,* Some believe that science is quickly applied into
technology in a science-leads-to-technological-advance sequence- Others
* See, for example, Brooks, (1967), Toulmin (1966), Sherwin and Isenson (1967)
and letters in response to Sherwin and Isenson in Science (1967, pp. 397-398),
Weinberg (1966), Price (1967), Brode (1964), Reiss and Balderston (1966),
Allison (1967).
35
believe that the advance of science is a phenomenon quite independent of
technology, and that science progresses at a rate that is a function of
its past rate of advance. Still another opinion is that science is a good
in itself that should be supported for the sake of knowledge, and that
its relationship to technology is a fringe benefit that need not enter
into the calculation of the value derived from scientific effort.
The wide diversity of opinion on this question may be narrowed through
an application of the findings reported in this volume. First, there is
an inevitable and considerable lag of time between scientific discovery
and technological utilization. This lag was indicated in Isenson's paper.
Schmookler (1966) also indicated that technological advanced in his sample
were not based upon recent science.
The science-to-technological-advance sequence may have an interesting
twist. A relatively rapid transfer of science into technology may tend
to be related to gap filling in cases where technology has advanced ahead
of science and the missing science is specified by a technological problem
(Marquis and Allen, 1967, pp. 1058-59). Mission orientation can thus speed
the transfer of science into utilization.
Reiss and Isenson reported little application of recent science emanating
from academic institutions except in situations where a firm had a basic
science group working on a similar problem and were able to contribute
to the transfer from science to technology through the resources of the
industrial base within which they worked.
McClelland observed that scientists were rewarded by publication and
did not see the implementation of their discoveries (the transfer from
science into utilization) as basic to their function. This observation,
although at first reading it might seem in conflict with the findings of
Reiss, is entirely in harmony with experience. There apparently exists
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a difference in motivation between a scientist working in industry and
a scientist working in an academic institution, McClelland's findings
appear relevant for scientists in the academic establishment. Reiss
also expressed reservations about the values and the experience of the
academic scientists who, as Goldman (1967, p 96) noted, "publish(ed)
in a narrow field of specialization in the journals dedicated to their fields.
The lack of motivation for demand recognition may explain the difference
between academic and industrial scientists. The academic community ("viewed
from the sheltered cloisters of academe") was blamed by the reviewer of
a recent book of readings on urban problems (Entevistle, 1967, p. 1) for
the low quality of solutions offered by social scientists publishing in
this field.
This observed failure of academic social scientists is an example of
mistaken expectations. Mission-oriented organizations have a need for
scientists, personnel trained at the frontier of a discipline. This training
provides a capability that is useful fcr solving technological problems
even in situations in which the actual science used is not "recent" in terms
of discovery date,
The contribution of academic scientific research* is the training
of students who are then able to engage in applied projects. Solow
(1963, p. 8) indicated this for science in economics:
* An exception here is the large applied projects that are often
as mission oriented as development projects in industry.
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I like a man to have mastered the fancy theory
before I trust him with the simple theory. The
practical utility of economics comes net primarily
from its high-powered frontier, but from fairly
low-powered reasoning (I think this occurs not
for any intrinsic reason, but because the data
are not available to give precision tc high-
powered theory. And in addition, it often turns
out that the high-powered theory of today is the
low-powered theory of tomorrow) , But the moral
is not that we can dispense with high-powered
economics, if only because high-powered economics
seems to be such an excellent school for the
skillful use of low-powered economics,
Solow's observation aptly describes the relationship between academic
research and the transfer of science to technology. The actual transfer
of science into technology requires a significant lag, but the training
of scientists who then enter into applied projects makes an immediate
contribution to the advance of technology.
"Professionalism" is a concept that should be contrasted to mission-
oriented activity in an analysis of the science-technology relationship.
Academic scientists do not have specified mission except the pursuit of
knowledge for its own sake. The evaluation system and reward structure
in the academic community are based upon scientific competence as observed
by one's peers in the academic community: Usefulness to the outside world
does not necessarily enter into this system- Until very recently attempts
to estimate the effect on the quality of teaching of this reward system
were given little attention Professors provide an example, therefore,
of professionals who are not subject to mission-oriented motivation to work
toward the transfer from science to utilization of technology.
There is even some concern as to whether interest in the application
of knowledge is in harmony with the pursuit of knowledge. Many universities
limit the amount of consulting that may be done by professors.
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If it is accepted that the two contributions of academic research are:
(1) to provide personnel trained at the frontier of knowledge who are able
to use this training in applied projects in industry, and (2) advance the
state of science for some future application to technology, then there
should not be concern over the findings that have reported the low
contribution of recent science of technological utilization
-
The translation of national technological requirements to the academic
community occurs when the profile of funding for academic research reflects
technological problems. The funding for academic research produces scientists
who are able to contribute to the technological problems. This process
through which government funding produces scientists trained in the disciplines
found to be essential for technological requirements was described in the
paper of William Price and his associates in AFOSR, Given this understanding
of the contribution that should be expected from academic research, then
it is entirely rational for a mission-oriented agency to fund academic
(non-mission-oriented) research. The value of such funding should net be
measured in terms of science that finds rapid incorporation into mission
objectives, Instead^ the first returns to the mission-oriented organization
are in personnel trained in the disciplines found necessary for applied work.
Only when a longer time span is considered should contributions of science
into technology be expected,
This focus on the science-technology relationship may be summarized
as follows:
(1) The immediate contribution of science to technology is in
the training of personnel to be employed in applied projects .
(2) The longer run contribution occurs after a necessary lag between
discovery and utilization has occurred.
(3) In cases where technology discovered a science gap and needed
science is specified, then there may be relatively rapid transfer
from science into technology under the spur of mission-oriented
organization.
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This application of the research findings on the transfer of science
to technology indicates the usefulness of such research. In a field
heretofore dominated by opinion, the basis for an operational understanding
of the process of transfer has been reached.
NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A comparison of the information specified by the structure created
in Figure 3 and the findings that were available for review indicates
that most of the necessary research has not yet been done.
An understanding of the human factor in the transfer of technologv,
based upon rigorous scientific investigation, represents a gap in the
state of managerial technology. A review of the factors cited by Burns
to explain the industrialization of Great Britain indicates the complexity
of the impact of society on technical progress at a national level."
Burns noted, the development of the institutions that facilitated technical
progress began in Britain about one hundred years before France and Germany
achieved the market economy, and the resulting motivations permitted Britain
to initiate what is now called the industrial Revolution.
That the process of technical advance is one that required conditions
that do not necessarily remain constant over time can be readily observed.
How can the speed of technology transfer to Japan and its efficient
utilization there be explained? Why has Great Britain lost this capability?
What happened over time to alter the steel industry from one in which
technology was eagerly sought to one in which adoption of new technology was sic*
* See Wolff, H. , "The Impact of Society on Science," The American Behavioral
Scientist
, May 1967, for a further discussion at this level of analysis.
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The complexity of such questions indicates that a process methodology
will be needed. Different weights for the variables would be expected at
the various levels of activity (as specified in Figure 3). Demand recognition,
technical feasibility recognition, inventive activity, ability /willingness
to achieve utilization are all parts of a systems analysis of technology
transfer- After parts of the system are understood, it should be possible
to link findings together into a more complete model of technology transfer.
It is interesting that scientists and engineers, people trained to
seek feedback and insist upon empirical evidence, have been content to conduct
their activities without the benefit of research on the process of technical
advance. Folklore on research management is passed on by men trained in
a tradition that does not permit the publication of unsupported statements
in their technical journals.
The great variance in performance as measured by technology transfer
observed when studying nations, industries, companies, and organizations
indicates this capability is one that warrants a better understanding than
is currently available, A comparison of the amounts of money allocated
to advance technical knowledge or to assist developing countries or regions
with the amounts allocated for research on the process through which new
technology is utilized indicates a disparity that would be corrected if
a cost/benefit analysis were to be applied, and the results of this analysis
implemented.
Given the value of the existing inventory of technical information and
the findings reported that: (1) most of the needed technical information
exists in inventory at the time of demand recognition; (2) if there is this
variance in the efficiency with which technical information is transferred,
then the returns to research designed to increase the understanding of the
41
process of technology transfer have a high expected value. A reduction
in the observed variance and some control over the process in order
to increase the overall efficiency of transfer both appear to be possible.
There is a difference between need and demand for a new technical
capability In this volume the need for the advance in understanding of
the technology transfer process has been identified. When demand recognition
for the required advance in managerial technology (i.e . , the better understanding
of the technology transfer process) is specified, it is probable that it
will be discovered that the necessary technology needed to satisfy this
demand will be found with relative ease in the available inventory.
Perhaps the best testimony for the knowledge gained in the MIT Conference
on the Human Factor in the Transfer of Technology is the detetermination
that demand recognition for a better understanding of the transfer of
technology will be solved in part by a transfer of technology from the
available inventory in the sequence of activity outlined in this chapter.
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